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DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY: THE GOALS OF 
HOME PROTECTION  
Burke Bindbeutel* 
I.  INTRODUCTION:  LAW AND THE PRIVATE HOME 
There exists a kind of “domestic exceptionalism” in many areas of the 
American legal tradition.  American officials have demonstrated great 
restraint in not extending prevailing norms and policies into private homes. 
Homes get special tax treatment, robust protection from criminal 
investigations, and in many municipalities, residential commerce does not 
adhere to principles of contract law.1  The militaristic adage that “a man’s 
home is his castle”2 has been widely ratified into law. 
On the other hand, much is not permitted within the home’s ramparts. 
It is unlikely that James Otis and any contemporary invokers of the “Castle 
Doctrine” mean that each citizen may retreat to a fortified enclave, free from 
the jurisdiction of God and man.  Few scholars would go as far as Justice 
Foster in the fictional case of the Speluncean Explorers.3  Foster argued that 
the experience of the cannibals trapped in a cave was so markedly different 
from that of everyday people that the law had ceased to have jurisdiction over 
them.4  “Whatever particular objects may be sought by the various branches 
of our law,” Foster wrote, “it is apparent on reflection that all of them are 
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(providing that landlords and tenants may not waive rights or remedies under chapter 5-12); N.Y.C., 
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 26-408 (2014), available at http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/nycode/ADC/26/ 
3/26-408 (providing eviction procedures). 
2. The well-known quote is variously attributed to Lord Blackstone, Sir Edward Coke, and American 
patriot James Otis.  Coke also noted that “the common law doth prohibit any subject to build any 
castle, or house of strength embattled . . ., without the king’s license, for the danger that might 
ensue.”  EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 161 
(Nabu Press 2010) (1644).  The symbolic castle-status provided to ordinary homes clashes with the 
prohibition of actual castles, with fortifications due to the threat of violence.  Already, in 1644, the 
authorities had recognized the potential for an “Indiana standoff.”  See infra Part VI. The 
contemporary invocation of the “Castle Doctrine,” in which everyone enjoys the privileges of a 
lordly estate and its concomitant right to wield deadly force, appears confused. 
3. See Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV 616, 620–26 (1949). 
4. Id.  
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directed toward facilitating and improving men’s coexistence and regulating 
with fairness and equity the relations of their life in common.”5  The corollary 
to this statement of law’s purpose is that the life not “in common” with 
fellows, the life not “in coexistence,” is a realm in which law ought not apply. 
But such a tidy summary of the limits of jurisdiction is not applicable 
to our legal scheme.  Accordingly, the law recognizes that some activities are 
impermissible in the home, just as anywhere else.  The legal atmosphere is 
thinner inside the domestic sphere, not because courts have no jurisdiction 
therein, but because the residents can best flourish when free from 
interference. 
This Article proposes an explanation for the special place of the home 
by surveying the development of privacy jurisprudence and grounding that 
development in our political tradition.  Legal home protection has evolved 
beyond a ceasefire between state and citizen.  Where before it was enough to 
stay the government’s intrusion into the home, there is today a recognition of 
the value of the intimate association of free individuals and the trust in 
government that arises from the respect shown to that intimate association.  
Legal protections of home that do not advance those values, such as home as 
commercial entity, or as a haven for gun rights, are not part of the guarantees 
of the Bill of Rights. 
II.  OVERVALUING THE HOME:  THE PROBLEM WITH 
“ALCHEMY” 
Personal rights exist in every geophysical context but appear to be 
enhanced in the domestic sphere.  It is tempting to describe this unique realm 
of personal freedom as a cloak that can be taken on and off; perhaps freedoms 
flourish indoors, and those freedoms are ceded as one leaves home.  To 
Darrell Miller, the home can neatly serve as a bastion of individual rights 
because it is a physically recognizable container.6 According to Miller, “the 
boundaries of the home help determine that which falls inside the social 
compact and that which falls outside of it.”7  In an attempt to fix a spatial 
limitation of gun ownership rights, Miller looks to instances when rights are 
amplified when citizens are at home.8 
Comparing gun-wielding to First Amendment rights in possessing 
obscene material, Miller recommends an expanded right to home defense 
while curtailing the usage of guns outside of the home.9  To Miller, “[T]his 
                                                                                                                           
5. Id. at 621. 
6.  See Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1304–09 (2009). 
7. Id. at 1305.  
8. Id. at 1280.  
9. Id. at 1305.  
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privilege of the home works a kind of alchemy with the Constitution.  Things 
of no constitutional value outside the home glister with constitutional 
meaning within it.”10  Miller acknowledges that his comparison of gun rights 
to the Supreme Court’s protection of obscenity in the house is designed to 
stem the ongoing constitutionalization of self-defense rights.11  Miller seeks 
to avoid the messy contradictions that the Supreme Court has imposed on 
Fourth Amendment privacy.12 
The extent to which the home is an automatic guarantor of personal 
rights is a source of disagreement among scholars.  Eugene Volokh rebuts 
the notion that the Bill of Rights protects homes for the sake of protecting 
homes.13  Volokh points out that the rights to the form of education or the 
sexual relations of one’s choosing cannot usually be asserted without leaving 
the home.14  To Volokh, Miller’s comparison of an unprotected category of 
speech (obscenity) with a right to self-defense is unwieldy, because, while 
constrained speech can move through other channels, assailants cannot be 
persuaded to relocate.15  It is not enough to consider a rights framework that 
merely suspends government policies at the top step of the porch.  It can’t be 
that a blatant illegality can transform into an object of constitutional 
protection when it is inside a home, “alchemy,” after all, is a bogus science. 
But it is the supposed domestic alchemy that inspired the Supreme 
Court’s push towards the constitutional protection of guns in District of 
Columbia v. Heller.16  The Court put the tradition of home protection in the 
service of gun rights, relying on a broadened meaning of “militia” to include 
“all able-bodied men,” so that a single person’s bearing of arms could fall 
under constitutional protection.17  Further, the textually explicit purpose of 
the Second Amendment, “the security of a free state,” was no longer to be 
used collectively against insurrections, tyrants, and standing armies, but 
instead as a personal response to an elevated local crime rate.18 The majority 
                                                                                                                           
10. Id.   
11. Id. at 1351–55. 
12. Id. at 1351. 
13. Eugene Volokh, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Oct. 28, 2009, 1:16 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2009/10/28/guns-as-smut-
defending-the-home-bound-second-amendment/. 
14. Id.  Although those activities involve decisions that are probably private and domestic, there must 
be a respect for citizenship as practiced in public, if this notion of liberty is to thrive.  See, e.g., 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (where due process liberty includes “not merely 
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the 
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up 
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy 
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by 
free men.”). 
15.  Volokh, supra note 13. 
16. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
17. Id. at 596. 
18.  See id. 
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opinion’s alchemy transformed a scheme for democratic distribution of war 
materiel into a tool for the safety of households.19 
This constitutionalized “Castle Doctrine” supposes a natural 
antagonism between the free citizen in her home and the rapacious tendrils 
of government, with the border between brimming with imminent violence. 
The evolution of the Second Amendment, though, did not deal with the 
relationship between state and home until Heller.  Instead, the Supreme Court 
gradually permitted the incorporation of state militias into the federal military 
structure,20 and the federal regulation of the interstate transportation of 
arms.21 The Supreme Court departed from this line and relied on Darrell 
Miller’s “alchemy” to fashion domestic exceptionalism into protection for 
gun rights.22 
Adam Benforado, like Darrell Miller and Justice Scalia, identified the 
home as a legal haven, as part of an analysis of the “ordering of protected 
spaces.”23  Like Miller, Benforado examined Stanley v. Georgia’s permission 
of obscene material in private spaces, while also noting the Alaska Supreme 
Court’s refusal to apply a marijuana prohibition to a private space.24  Sexual 
privacy to Benforado also appeared predicated on the possession of a 
protected home space.25  Finally, Benforado noted the state-sanctioned use 
of deadly force in defense of the home, concluding that “the protections in 
such laws seem to flow largely from the space of the home itself rather than 
from property rights enjoyed by owners or inhabitants . . . [B]eing within the 
micro space of the home may effectively negate the practical effect of being 
within the macro space of the jurisdiction . . . .”26  Like Miller’s analysis, we 
encounter the effects of “alchemy,” and the home-bound intransigence is 
protected simply because it takes place in a home. 
The true spirit of home protection is that the esteem exchanged between 
the private and public world, the pact of mutual trust, is the genesis of our 
civil society.  When the state demurs from officiating affairs inside the home, 
it is not because it has been violently beaten back, but because it knows better 
than to compromise the trust that it has attained.  The “right to privacy” or 
“right to be let alone” represents not a constraint on powerful state actors, but 
rather a subordination of those state actors to private decisions.  In this 
context, home protection is not a commitment to legal inaction, but rather, a 
                                                                                                                           
19. Id. at 622 (“The traditional militia was formed from a pool of men bringing arms ‘in common use 
at the time’ for lawful purposes like self-defense.”). 
20. Cox v. Wood, 247 U.S. 3 (1918). 
21.  See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
22.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
23. Adam Benforado, The Geography of Criminal Law, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 823, 884 (2010). 
24. Id. at 882 (quoting Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975)). 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 883–84. 
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strategy of self-confidence, reflective of a belief that free people, when given 
the choice, will choose to assimilate into a free society. 
The roots of domestic exceptionalism are ancient.  The doctrine was 
forcefully reasserted during the upheavals of seventeenth century England 
and again in America’s revolutionary period.27  Home protection has taken 
on a special intensity in the last 100 years.  The development of the theories 
of psychological vulnerability, choice of education28, and sexual privacy29 
have led to a broadened home protection, housed in an expanding right to 
substantive due process.30 
In order to respect private citizens so that they may in turn respect the 
state, it is necessary to recognize the qualities of home that deserve protection 
and those that do not.  To better foster assimilation, the protection of the 
home should center on mutual trust and intimate association, rather than 
home as a defense bastion or as a physical possession.  Most crucially, the 
use of home defense as a strategy to broaden self-defense rights and to defeat 
gun regulation should end because the strategy depends on an erroneous 
theory of the home’s place in the law. 
III.  THE POSITION OF THE HOME IN THE MODERN STATE:  
ENGLISH REVOLUTION AND COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 
Lord William Blackstone recognized the private interest in the integrity 
of home as predating English nationhood, predating even the arrival of the 
species, “[E]ven the brute creation, to whom everything else was in common, 
maintained a kind of permanent property in their dwellings, especially for the 
protection of their young; that the birds . . . had nests, and the beasts . . . had 
caverns, the invasion of which they esteemed a very flagrant injustice.”31  
Accordingly, “the law of England has so particular and tender a regard to the 
immunity of a man’s house, that it stiles it his castle, and will never suffer it 
to be violated with impunity.”32 
 When American patriots argued for the protection of homes from 
arbitrary government action, they advocated for the qualities of freedom 
associated with the reign of Edward the Confessor.33  American revolutionary 
                                                                                                                           
27. See CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN (Liberty Fund, 
Inc. 2010), available at http://www.constitution.org/cmt/mcilw/mcilw.htm.   
28.  See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that a Nebraska statute prohibiting the 
teaching of foreign languages violated the Due Process Clause).  
29. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that there is a right to privacy in marital 
relations).  
30. See Louis Brandeis & Samuel Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
31. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *121, *122 (1867).  
32. 4 id. at *958. 
33. See JAMES OTIS, RIGHTS OF BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED 31 (1764), available at 
http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/2335/Otis_RightsBritishColonies1556.pdf. 
6 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 39 
 
James Otis opposed the systematic home invasions of the English 
monarchists, and he found justification for his position in the ancient 
constitution.34  Otis averred that “liberty was better understood, and more 
fully enjoyed by our ancestors, before the coming in of the first Norman 
Tyrants than ever after . . . .”35 Ancient constitutionalism strikes against a 
deviant or arbitrary state action.  “The ‘merit’ of the ancient constitution was 
not in the antiquity of its usage but in the degree of security from 
governmental whim and caprice . . . in the customary jurisprudence of an 
unwritten constitution there is no element more essential to liberty than 
security against arbitrariness.”36 
The need for protection against arbitrariness increased as modern 
militarism began to appear.  The civilian population inevitably bore a heavy 
burden from army activity.  The English Petition of Right in 1628 arose as a 
response to the rights violations of Charles I during the Thirty Years’ War.37  
Chief among these abuses was the forced billeting of soldiers within private 
homes, an outgrowth of the king’s “forced loans” for the war effort without 
the approval of Parliament.38  The Petition of Right is an important English 
constitutional document for its affirmation of the rule of law and of civil 
liberties in the face of a monarch’s arbitrary decisions to resort to martial law, 
which at the time was seen not necessarily as an invasion but instead as an 
interruption in the rule of law.39  A new power base was articulating its rights 
and interests: the merchants and manufacturers, whose clout would, in time, 
spread throughout much of the world.40 
Modern rights frameworks were further clarified by late seventeenth 
century events.  The overthrow of James II in 1689 and Parliament’s Bill of 
Rights stand out as assertions of the autonomy of the private home in the face 
of concentrated monarchical power.41  Parliament had in 1679 enacted the 
                                                                                                                           
34.  Id.; see also JAMES OTIS, AGAINST WRITS OF ASSISTANCE (1761), available at 
http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/writs.htm (“Now, one of the most essential branches of English 
liberty is the freedom of one’s house.  A man’s house is his castle; and whilst he is quiet, he is as 
well guarded as a prince in his castle.”). 
35. OTIS, supra note 33.   
36. John Phillip Reid, The Jurisprudence of Liberty, in ROOTS OF LIBERTY 181 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1993). 
37. See J. A. Guy, The Origins of the Petition of Right Reconsidered, 25 HIST. J. 289 (1982). 
38. See generally PAULINE GREGG, KING CHARLES I (1964); RICHARD CUST, CHARLES I: A POLITICAL 
LIFE (2007); CHARLES CARLTON, CHARLES I: THE PERSONAL MONARCH (2d ed. 1995). 
39. See Steve Bachmann, Starting Again with the Mayflower . . . England’s Civil War and America’s 
Bill of Rights, 20 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 193, 202 (2000). 
40. GEORGE L. CHERRY, EARLY ENGLISH LIBERALISM: ITS EMERGENCE THROUGH PARLIAMENTARY 
ACTION, 1660-1702, at 12 (1962) (“The association of privilege and rights with movable property 
was the accomplishment of a new social class becoming powerful in England during the seventeenth 
century.”). 
41.  A contemporaneous pamphlet summarized the issue: “Posterity will be ashamed to own,/The 
actions we their ancestors have done,/When they for ancient precedents enquire,/And to the Journals 
of this age retire,/To see one tyrant banish’d from his home,/To set five hundred traitors in his 
room.”  See MCILWAIN, supra note 27.  
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Anti-Quartering Act, forbidding the King from billeting his soldiery onto the 
people.42  However, James II ignored the Act, which was a major factor in 
his eventual removal and exile.43  England’s Bill of Rights, in addition to 
constitutionalizing a prohibition on quartering soldiers, also forbade, in the 
same clause, a peacetime standing army without the consent of Parliament.44  
The King’s incursions into private homes occasioned not just violent 
resistance, but an organized desire for a government that was physically 
restrained from the private sphere.45  The protections that Britons declared 
for themselves sounded in the integrity of property-based privacy interests 
and in the limitations on the ways that a sovereign could marshal armed 
forces against its own people.46  These revolutionaries were the architects of 
the modern liberal state.47 
In the American colonies, objections to the quartering of soldiers, the 
forcible disarming of citizens, and the maintenance of standing armies drew 
from seventeenth century British revolutionary thought.48  In addition to the 
other forms of monarchical oppression, quartering was criticized early and 
consistently.49 
Patriots defended the home and denounced the Quartering Act, a 1765 
parliamentary edict that explicitly required colonists to personally provide 
for an army that they increasingly saw as an occupying force.50  This 
legislation, sibling to the Stamp Act (together they were reviled as “the 
Intolerable Acts”) forced a consideration of the extent to which a distant 
authority may impose soldiers into private personal zones.51  In response, six 
colonies enacted constitutional provisions forbidding quartering.52  The 
specific quality of this tyranny engendered much debate during the crucible 
period of American politics, both as a specific grievance to a real harm and 
                                                                                                                           
42.  GERALDINE WOODS, RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 6 (2005). 
43. Id.  
44.  English Bill of Rights 1689, THE AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ 
england.asp (last visited Oct. 13, 2014) [hereinafter Bill of Rights]. 
45.  See William S. Fields, The Third Amendment:  Constitutional Protection from the Involuntary 
Quartering of Soldiers, 124 MIL. L. REV. 195, 197 (1989) (explaining that resistance towards 
quartering soldiers “became one of the issues propelling the nation toward civil war”).  
46. See Bill of Rights, supra note 44. The Bill of Rights, broadly speaking, subordinated monarchical 
power to the authority of Parliament. 
47. See STEVE PINCUS, 1688: THE FIRST MODERN REVOLUTION (2009) (arguing that the 1688 Glorious 
Revolution was the first modern revolution, creating a bureaucratic and participatory state). 
48.  See OTIS, AGAINST WRITS OF ASSISTANCE, supra note 34. 
49.  See Fields, supra note 45, at 199 (explaining that complaints against quartering soldiers began as 
early as 1675).   
50.  Id. at 200–01. 
51.  Id. at 201.  
52. See Andrew P. Morriss & Richard L. Stroup, Quartering Species: The “Living Constitution,” The 
Third Amendment, and the Endangered Species Act, 30 ENVTL L. 769, 781 (2000) (New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New York). 
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as a general principle under which free people must live.53  A prohibition on 
forced quartering was enshrined in the Bill of Rights, mostly at the urging of 
the Anti-Federalists.54 
The Boston Pamphlet of 1772 itemized contemporary grievances, and 
it also operated as a declaration of natural rights.55  To eighteenth century 
revolutionists, the two strategies were intertwined.  The Pamphlet joined the 
right to be free from tampering soldiers with the right not to have unfair taxes 
imposed, considering both to be general, natural rights.56  Colonists took a 
holistic approach when they spoke up for their property rights and the 
sanctity of their homes.  They were already moving towards an expression of 
the more basic rights without which property was not possible, the protection 
from arbitrariness and even the “right to be let alone” that Thomas M. Cooley 
later identified.57 
The “Intolerable Acts” permitted invasions of both home and property, 
and these transgressions fed modern warfare and modern imperialism.58  This 
development led to the articulation of a sense of private autonomy, which 
denounced the transgressions against private citizens as well as against the 
principles of self-government that undergird free society.59  It was necessary 
to protect the home in order to protect the health of the whole. 
IV.  THE DISCOVERY OF PRIVACY:  FROM TORT ACTION TO 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
Although the home may appear to be the most natural location for 
privacy, the pioneers of a “right to privacy” did not base their new tort on an 
instance of home invasion.  It was the humiliation caused by unwanted 
publicity from the new technology of photography that led Samuel Warren 
and Louis Brandeis to articulate the right to privacy in their famous law 
review article.60  The recognition of a need to prevent assaults on privacy 
came in an age of rapid urbanization and scientific advances about 
psychological well-being.  Years later, privacy would be invoked to protect 
sexual choice.61  There arose, in the Griswold v. Connecticut line of cases, 
                                                                                                                           
53. See Fields, supra note 45, at 201–02.  
54. U.S. CONST. amend. III (“No soldier shall, in time or place be quartered in any house, without the 
consent of the owner, nor in any time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”). 
55.  BOSTON COMMITTEE FOR CORRESPONDENCE, THE BOSTON PAMPHLET (1772), excerpts available 
at http://www.nationalhumanitiescenter.org/pds/makingrev/crisis/text6/bostonpamphlet.pdf. 
56. Id.  
57. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS: OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE 
INDEPENDENTLY OF CONTRACT 29 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1993) (1878). 
58.  See Fields, supra note 45, at 201.  
59.  Id. at 202. 
60. Brandeis & Warren, supra note 30.  
61. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).   
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the argument that privacy was a “penumbral” right without which the other 
rights would not exist.62 
These guarantees did not depend on a physical restraint of state power 
at the boundaries of the private home.  Physical incursions by state actors 
into homes are today mostly limited to the most aggressive sort of criminal 
investigation, and, even then, the Fourth Amendment imposes serious 
constraints.63  Rather than beating back arbitrary monarchists, today’s 
conception of personal liberty aims to protect the tenuous peacefulness that 
people enjoy when left alone.  Privacy law does not focus especially on 
physical manifestations of state power.  It instead valorizes the condition of 
personal independence that pervades when a person is permitted a zone into 
which only he or she may enter, regardless of where that zone lies. 
At the turn of twentieth century, rapid urbanization and technological 
advances made citizens newly vulnerable.64  Congested cities gave rise not 
just to physical maladies like typhoid and cholera but to economic 
displacement and psychological stress.65  Mass media and mass migration 
changed human society, and they also revealed certain qualities of human 
existence, the disruption of which harmed freedom.  Brandeis and Warren 
observed this process and argued that legal protections had to keep pace with 
new harms.66  In their historical introduction, the authors wrote that while 
law formerly only protected people from “physical interference with life or 
property . . . there later came a recognition of man’s spiritual nature, of his 
feelings and his intellect.”67  
The boldest assertion of Brandeis and Warren’s argument was to 
include privacy in the tradition of property rights.68  They described property 
                                                                                                                           
62. See id. at 484 (“[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations 
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.  Various guarantees create zones of 
privacy.” (citations omitted)); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 129 (1973). 
63. U.S. CONST. amend IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, house, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and persons or things to be seized.”).  
64. See generally RUTH SCHWARTZ COWAN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY 166 
(1997) (exploring how technological advances in America are related to the country’s social 
development). 
65. WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY (Harvard Univ. Press 1981) (1890).  Just across 
campus from the Harvard Law Review where Brandeis and Warren’s famous article was published, 
William James founded the first American laboratory for experimental psychology in 1875.  The 
same year that The Right to Privacy appeared, James published the influential Principles of 
Psychology.  James argued that although people possessed instincts just as lower animals do, their 
instincts collide with expectations of consequences, out of which collision the human personality is 
formed. 
66.  Brandeis & Warren, supra note 30, at 195. 
67.  Id. at 193. 
68. Id. at 219. 
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as both tangible and intangible, as “every form of possession.”69  Brandeis 
and Warren concluded their denunciation of privacy-violators by insisting 
that it is not enough to protect homes from government agents, there must 
additionally be a refuge from aggressive journalism, “The common law has 
always recognized a man’s house as his castle, impregnable, often, even to 
his own officers engaged in the execution of its commands. Shall the courts 
thus close the front entrance to constituted authority, and open wide the back 
door to idle or prurient curiosity?”70 
As a defense against the constitutionally protected behavior of taking 
personal photographs, Brandeis and Warren described a privacy tort that was 
not their own invention but had evolved, keeping pace with the changing 
nature of human interactions.71  If assault had grown out of battery, reasoned 
the jurists, then courts could now affirm that incursions into zones of privacy 
cause real damage.72  Human sensations have legal value, and our society 
protects thoughts and feelings, as much as it does property and bodies.  An 
earlier, more primitive society could only manage to redress the direct harms 
from the most egregious, palpable acts (trespassing and battery).  Warren and 
Brandeis wrote in 1890 that courts had begun to recognize symbolic and 
emotional harm stemming from these privacy invasions.73  Harms no longer 
had to be bare and literal, argued Warren and Brandeis.74  There were other, 
subtler forms of damage that the law also protected. 
“Privacy,” thus constituted, represents an innovation in the 
understanding of human vulnerability.  Protections in the Bill of Rights had 
heretofore focused on literal intrusions (Second and Third Amendments), 
political liberty (First Amendment) or appropriate legal procedures (Fifth, 
Sixth, and Seventh Amendments).  Up to this point, the integrity of the home 
was based on a quality of political liberty, or possibly on a commercial 
independence (the Fourth Amendment’s “papers”), but this was something 
else.  Warren and Brandeis described their privacy tort as an emanation of 
“rights as against the world.”75  Brandeis and Warren’s formulation supposed 
a congenital fragility in citizens that opportunists could exploit. This fragility 
would become a matter of constitutional concern when the opportunists were 
state actors. 
Brandeis got the opportunity to elevate the right to privacy from the 
realm of tort law into constitutional law in his dissent in Olmstead v. United 
States.76 In an unwarranted wiretapping case, Brandeis argued that the 
                                                                                                                           
69.  Id. at 193. 
70.  Id. at 220.  
71. Id.   
72. Id. 
73.  Id. at 195. 
74. Id.   
75. Id. at 213. 
76. 277 U.S. 438, 471–86 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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government’s incursion violated “the most comprehensive of rights,” a sort 
of ne plus ultra of constitutional protections.77  Brandeis expanded a police 
misconduct case from the cubbyhole of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
into the broader context of a right to privacy.  Brandeis wrote that: 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to 
the pursuit of happiness.  They recognized the significance of man’s 
spiritual nature, of his feelings[,] and of his intellect.  They knew that only 
a part of the pain, pleasure[,] and satisfactions of life are to be found in 
material things.  They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their 
thoughts, their emotions[,] and their sensations.  They conferred, as against 
the government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights 
and the right most valued by civilized men.  To protect, that right, every 
unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the 




Brandeis’s view did not prevail in 1928 but would carry the day when Katz 
v. United States constitutionalized criminal investigations.79  Furthermore, 
Boyd v. United States extended Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections 
against police rummaging.80 
The Brandeis and Warren recognition of “rights as against the world” 
developed from a recognition of a basic human sensitivity into a 
constitutional right, linked to the necessity of a restrained government.81  The 
difference between their “privacy” and the Boston Pamphlet’s iteration of 
freedom was a certain increased sensitivity to human vulnerabilities. 
The Katz and Boyd doctrines represented a flourishing of the privacy 
that Brandeis and Warren developed.  The Katz test, limiting police searches 
to when suspects have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, 
transcends physical space.82  The fact that the investigating officers did not 
physically interfere with the suspect’s person did not mean that there was not 
an incursion into a zone of privacy.83  This privacy was just more abstract, 
and it was not contained in the domestic space. 
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Tort privacy and criminal privacy were the forebears of a twentieth 
century judicial development, substantive due process privacy.84  In Griswold 
v. Connecticut, Justice William Douglas picked up where Brandeis left off.85  
In the criminal prosecution of a married couple that used contraception in 
violation of a Connecticut state law, Douglas reversed the lower court with a 
limited but radical assertion of substantive due process rights.86  The State 
could not forbid a married couple from deciding when and whether to have 
children.87 The groundbreaking sexual privacy ruling said that a married 
couple’s decision to use contraceptives could not be taken away by the 
Connecticut legislature.88  The decision drew on “penumbras” of the Bill of 
Rights, and was ostensibly limited to rights located in the “sacred precincts 
of marital bedrooms.”89  Griswold also appeared to rely on the legal 
protections afforded to marriage, “Marriage is a coming together for better 
or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.  
It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in 
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social 
project.”90 
 Justice Douglas’ holding employed a unique method of constitutional 
analysis.  Douglas looked to how the right of association was drawn out from 
the First Amendment, and offered that example as an analogy for his 
constitutional right of privacy, which, like “association,” did not have an 
explicit textual basis.91  Douglas was careful to restrict his holding to cover 
sexual privacy in the context of marriage, but later decisions broadened the 
right to sexual privacy.  In Eisenstadt v. Baird, an unmarried couple was 
granted the same rights of the married couple in Griswold,92 and in Roe v. 
Wade, the Court held that the privacy doctrine covered abortion rights.93 
By now, the “sacred precincts” of the home had become an ungainly 
proxy for the meta-right that the Supreme Court was constitutionalizing. 
Reproductive choice may take place in private to a certain extent, but it also 
necessarily includes a regulation of medical practice, which today typically 
occurs outside of homes. 
Thomas C. Grey discusses the establishment of rights to sexual 
freedom, seeing the Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretation as, above 
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all, enforcing stability.94  As social mores became more tolerant of sexual 
choice and other private activity, the Supreme Court responded not by 
offering broad protections but by favoring “stability-centered concerns of 
modern conservative family and population policy.”95  Today there are 
constitutional rights to an abortion and corresponding interests of states to 
stifle those abortion rights.96  The judicial impulse to defer to the status quo, 
to disarm any political movement to regulate sexuality, continues the 
tradition of mutual trust between governed and government.  Deference to 
private choice, then, is not a goal in and of itself but a reliable means to 
protect the status quo. 
Jed Rubenfeld writes that the key to privacy is not in whether the law 
being reviewed infringes on some fundamental right—instead jurists must 
inspect what the law imposes and evaluate whether that imposition is an 
overreach.97  Privacy, then, is a check on a totalitarian state, the kind of place 
that would impose a one-child policy or root through the desk where your 
business is conducted. 
A home is property, but we must consider a home something more if 
the law applies so differently to it.  Michael Anthony Lawrence, in his 
argument for a constitutional right to autonomy, points out that the term 
“property” as found in the two Due Process Clauses includes not just physical 
things, but also abstract interests, like rights and opinions.98  Somewhere in 
our instinctive protection of the home, there is a sense that without an 
unperturbed private zone, the premise of a society of self-governing people 
would collapse.  Lawrence sees protection on nonmaterial “property” as 
largely coterminous with a right of autonomy,99 and autonomy is not 
something that exists ex nihilo, it is a strategy and a guiding hope of our legal 
tradition. 
The discovery of a personal freedom of the mind and body has 
broadened home-protection, but it has done so only as a byproduct of the 
increased sensitivity to personal privacy and the role of that privacy in a free 
society.  To insist that the home is the natural and exclusive setting of 
personal privacy is to abrogate the right, and to decontextualize it from the 
broader dynamic between democratic government and free individual. 
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Efforts to contain personal liberty in the home space end by denaturing 
liberty. 
V.  THE HOME AS SACRED SPACE:  FETISHIZING REAL ESTATE 
Margaret Jane Radin argues for two genres of property, fungible and 
personal, because personal property is bound up with personhood.100  To 
support her theory, she marshals Kant and Hegel, then surveys the American 
legal tradition and underlines instances where property takings are restricted 
due to the personhood interest.101  Radin is careful to acknowledge “the 
problem of fetishism,” whereby personal property’s worth becomes 
exaggerated.102 
Radin finds most of her support for property as personhood by 
emphasizing the special solicitude for the home. 
Our reverence for the sanctity of the home is rooted in the understanding 
that the home is inextricably part of the individual, the family, and the fabric 
of society.  Where other kinds of object relations attain qualitatively similar 
individual and social importance, they should be treated similarly.103  
It is arguable that homes or any form of property are “inextricably part of the 
individual . . . .”104  The distinction between “personal and fungible” may be 
too tenuous to hold, but Radin is right about one thing, protecting physical 
space is a means to protecting the fabric of society. 
John Fee is in step with Radin in his protest over the Kelo v. City of New 
London decision.105  More than just an expansion of the Takings Clause to 
allow the “public purpose” of government takings to be any lucrative private 
enterprise, Fee sees Kelo as near-blasphemous.106  He surveys the special 
exceptions for the home in the First Amendment (Stanley v. Georgia), Third 
Amendment (Engblom v. Carey), Fourth Amendment (Kyllo v. United 
States), and, most of all, in the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.107  Fee 
also includes the homestead exemption for debtor-creditor law and criminal 
law’s Castle Doctrine.108  The righteousness of the argument is signaled by 
the chosen epigram from Sir William Pitt: 
                                                                                                                           
100. Margaret Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). 
101.  Id.  
102.  Id. at 968. 
103.  Id. at 1013. 
104.  Id. 
105.  See John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of the Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783 (2006).  
106. Id. at 797–99. 
107. Id. at 786–88. 
108. Id. at 787. 
2014]  Domestic Tranquility 15 
 
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the 
Crown.  It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; 
the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot 
enter—all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!109 
While it is clear that home protection is a longstanding tradition, Fee does 
not identify what is valuable beyond the value of homes qua homes. The 
result of emphasizing homes at any cost is a near-fetishization of real estate. 
A formalistic focus on protecting the home, subordinating other public 
priorities to domestic life, is an error.  For instance, the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence distinguishes between protected “curtilage” and 
freely searchable “open fields.”110  This formulation has required courts to 
create finer and finer distinctions around homes.  In United States v. Reilly, 
contraband discovered by police was inadmissible because it was found in a 
mowed area near the defendant’s house.111  The court held that the care given 
to the homeowner’s lawn was enough to assert privacy interests, whereas if 
he had neglected the grass his privacy would have been relinquished.112 
Limiting rights to the home space is a step towards denying those rights 
altogether.  In Minnesota v. Carter, a houseguest had no privacy interest 
because he did not spend the night.113  The privacy interests in the home seem 
all the more fragile after Hudson v. Michigan, when the Supreme Court 
declined to suppress evidence after police had disobeyed a “knock-and-
announce” requirement in their warrant.114  The Court acknowledged that the 
exclusionary rule serves to protect the “privacy and dignity” of the suspects, 
but that officer safety and law enforcement goals outweighed those values.115  
Like Reilly’s location of Fourth Amendment privacy some place where the 
tall grass meets the short grass,116 the Hudson decision casts doubt on 
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whether the integrity of the home as it is currently understood can prevent 
police from searching it without a warrant.  
Darrell Miller avows that his comparison of gun rights in the home to 
possession of obscene material is in part to avoid the messy contradictions of 
Fourth Amendment privacy.117  If only we could figure out where the privacy 
is really in effect, the thinking goes, then the zones could be clearly 
delineated.  But “privacy” ebbs and flows; it finds safe haven in various 
spaces, and in different contexts.  A survey about the violativeness of home 
searches revealed that the bedroom registers as the area most vulnerable to 
government penetration.118  This response is probably due to the private 
sexual relations customarily conducted there, which seems to position a 
bedroom-occupant into the context of Griswold’s substantive due process 
privacy rights. 
Stephanie Stern, on the other hand, argues that the founding generation 
favored protections over mail and workspaces, because privacy in the 
business context was a more important spur to the protection of the home 
against state invaders.119  Stern points out that Katz represented a shift in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence from protected places to protected 
persons.120  To Stern, the real interest protected by the Fourth Amendment is 
against “subjective intrusiveness.”121  The instinct to protect only the home 
can be traced to romantic idealizations, and New Deal-era government 
policy,122 more than to authentic notions of security from government 
interference.  “From the perspective of a cultural historian or property scholar 
. . . this persistent reverence is part of a broader cultural ascendance of the 
home across the last century—an ascendance that governmental actors and 
private business interests largely engineered.”123 And, “The modern-day 
judicial sentiment that all details within the home are intimate details is eerily 
reminiscent of the Romantic ideal of the home as an idealized and 
encapsulated private domestic sphere in which to retreat from modern 
life.”124 
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Stern contends that the immemorial legal tradition of home protection 
could be based on a misunderstanding, or even a hoax,  
Contrary to the claims of some commentators, there is no evidence that 
residential privacy reflects an innate, biological drive to defend against 
territorial intrusion.  Humans are evolutionarily social beings, and the 
flexibility of their property arrangements (and defense of territorial 
property) reflects this pro-social orientation.  From prehistoric man to 
Native-American tribes to modern communes, people have cohabitated in 
groups, foregone private-property systems and stable settlement bounds, 
and lived nomadically.  In order for social groups to function, individuals 
must submit at times to various social and physical incursions that are 
acceptable to the group, or a dominant force within the group, but 
undesirable to the affected individual.125 
To Stern, the normative reflex to protect contemporary domestic spaces is 
not based on any fundamental right, and we should leave open options of 
nomadism or large-group cohabitation.126  She confronts Radin’s “property 
as personhood” head-on when she points out that an American home is not 
inextricably entwined with personhood at all, but is instead just a commodity 
that is transferred every five years.127  Privacy law has conflated the need for 
limits on person-to-person relationships with the protection of physical 
space.  “[C]ontrary to the assumption that homes are uniquely vulnerable, the 
potential for overreaching and harassment appears higher in nonresidential 
contexts that currently receive more limited protection, such as searches of 
financial records and computer storage.”128 Stern would rather see a 
modernized interpretation of the Fourth Amendment’s “papers and effects,” 
protecting cell phones and other digital connections.129  Stern concludes that 
home-protection is an “imperfect proxy” for the defending the values that 
take place in homes: “substantive privacy and intimate association.”130 
Stern also has written against the contention that the home is a 
necessary possession in order to achieve psychological flourishing.131  Stern 
sees more potential for growth in the American habit of redomiciling.132  
Neighborhood ties are often overvalued and less important than they have 
been in the past.  The great reverence we have for homeownership and its 
salutary effects on communities may also be misplaced; homeowners are 
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only slightly less mobile, and only slightly more community-invested and 
likely to vote than renters.133  Hence, fracturing neighborhoods may not in 
fact deplete social capital, contra the arguments of advocates for foreclosure 
relief.  To Stern, public subsidies to remedy the victimization caused by 
home-loss could be better spent.134 
Stern is not alone in arguing that home possession is overprotected in 
the law.  D. Benjamin Barros points to an overreliance on a “cliché” ideology 
of the home.135  These scholars are correct to note the confusion that results 
from protecting the home for the sake of protecting the home, but they mostly 
ignore the most serious danger in a formalistic approach to home defense. 
The necessary corollary of Radin and Fee’s protection of the home at 
any cost is a robust right to defend private homes from violent onslaught. The 
common law recognized a duty to retreat from danger, and then a caveat that 
once one had entered one’s home, there was probably no possibility of 
retreating further.136   This manifestation of home protection is not about the 
special qualities that homes have in a free society, but only that it is where a 
marksman ends up when he is finished backing away. The “Stand Your 
Ground” doctrine has found a champion in the National Rifle Association, 
which has sought to broker a treaty between criminals and victims by striking 
a delicate balance of terror.137  This is not traditional, but rather a recent 
innovation, with its current high-water mark symbolized by District of 
Columbia v. Heller.138 
The Court’s alignment of Second Amendment rights with the “home as 
sacred space” is the most problematic manifestation of home overprotection.  
A recent political movement has used home-defense as its most important 
prong in defeating federal regulations of gun ownership.139 McDonald v. 
Chicago broadened the Heller holding and asserted an originalist theory that 
weaponized home-defense is a fundamental right.140 
The home needs to be considered in a new light.  Protecting the home 
should not lead to thwarting police objectives or implicitly approving of 
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genocide,141 it should serve to reaffirm the dignity of free people, and to 
shore up their capacity to participate in a free society.  Brandeis and Warren’s 
article served to transpose an ancient idea of liberty onto modern social 
arrangements.142  Our understanding of spaces and places and privacy is 
denatured when it is explored exclusively through the Second or Fourth 
Amendments.  Property-based privacy interests do not appear when police 
officers undertake a criminal investigation or when a robbery takes place. 
They were there all along, and they protect against other, subtler kinds of 
incursions. 
VI.  CODA: THE INDIANA STANDOFF, LUTHER V. BORDEN, AND 
JOHN STUART MILL 
The atavistic instinct to protect the home from any government action 
is not a good framework for social progress.  The consequences of the instinct 
were revealed when the Indiana legislature responded to a police incident at 
the threshold of a private home.143  A man accused of domestic assault fought 
off a police officer but was arrested anyway.144  The legislature responded to 
his conviction by announcing rights to physically resisting a policeman from 
within your home or car.145  This new protection may have only represented 
a political gesture, unlikely to be put into practice, but even so, the statute 
sounds in misapprehension of the reasons for home protection.  Meeting law 
enforcement with a violent response does nothing to burnish the esteem that 
government and citizens share for one another. 
The danger of home-defense as suspension of law enforcement is that 
we end up treating each home as its own polis, in which violence or any 
behavior can reign unchecked.  The right to domestic tranquility is not an 
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ultimate right to dominate your house, or to do anything and everything 
inside of it.  Instead, it aligns with the “Domestic Tranquility” of the United 
States Constitution’s Preamble, i.e., the health of the nation.146  Unmolested 
citizens tend to form open and trusting societies, and the recognition of this 
fact has animated personal rights within homes. 
The nineteenth century Supreme Court case Luther v. Borden147 found 
the balance that Indiana lawmakers did not.  Home invasions lead to 
aggrieved parties, but the agent of the public (here defending the public peace 
during Dorr’s Rebellion) deserves a corresponding protection: 
And if the sanctity of domestic life has been violated, the castle of the 
citizen broken into, or property or person injured, without good cause, in 
either case a jury of the country should give damages, and courts are bound 
to instruct them to do so, unless a justification is made out fully on correct 
principles.  This can and should be done without any vindictive punishment, 
when a party appears to have acted under a supposed legal right…it shows 
the beautiful harmony of our system, not to let private damage be suffered 
wrongfully without redress, but, at the same time, not to let a public agent 
suffer, who, in a great crisis, appears to have acted honestly for the public, 
from good probable cause, though in some degree mistaking the extent of 
his powers, as well as the rights of others.148 
The mutually beneficial esteem shared between enlightened state and free 
citizen that the Luther Court identified is also a central theme of John Stuart 
Mill’s On Liberty.149  Mill identified a key shift from the old to the new 
regime, 
A time, however, came in the progress of human affairs when men ceased 
to think it a necessity of nature that their governors should be an 
independent power, opposed in interest to themselves. It appeared to them 
much better that the various magistrates of the State should be their tenants 
or delegates, revocable at their pleasure…by degrees, this new demand for 
elective and temporary rulers became the prominent object of the exertions 
of the popular party, wherever any such party existed; and superseded, to a 
considerable extent, the previous efforts to limit the power of rulers.150 
To Mill, a nation’s advancement is visible in the degree to which individuals 
and governments cooperate.  At the same time, Mill identified a private zone 
that ought not be subject to state regulation, 
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[T]here is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the 
individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending all that 
portion of a person’s life and conduct which affects only himself, or, if it 
also affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent 
and participation . . . it comprises, first, the inward domain of 
consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most 
comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of 
opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, 
moral, or theological . . . Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes 
and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of 
doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow; without 
impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm 
them even though they should think our conduct foolish . . . thirdly, from 
this liberty . . . mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live 
as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good 
to the rest.151 
To Mill, the proper statecraft is not merely a limitation on governmental 
power.  The modern struggle is to ensure a stable arrangement of self-
governing individuals.  In the classic work’s final paragraph, Mill offered a 
reason why democratic states would limit their own power. 
The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals 
composing it; and a State which postpones the interests of their mental 
expansion and elevation, to a little more of administrative skill or that 
semblance of it which practice gives, in the details of business; a State, 
which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in 
its hands even for beneficial purposes, will find that with small men no great 
thing can really be accomplished; and that the perfection of machinery to 
which it has sacrificed everything, will in the end avail it nothing, for want 
of the vital power which in order that the machine might work more 
smoothly, it has preferred to banish.152 
In this sense, “domestic tranquility” can become “Domestic Tranquility.” 
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